The False Ombudsman: Mitigating Temerary Consumer Litigation in the Dominican Airline Industry through Decentralized Justice

Joan Bisonó — 2026-03-22T12:00:00.000Z

Blockchain & Disputes · Kleros · Consumer Protection · Airlines · Decentralized Justice · Dominican Republic

Analysis of the False Ombudsman phenomenon in the Dominican airline industry: vexatious litigation, consumer schemes mimicking ombudsmen, and Kleros as a decentralized justice solution.

Introduction

The absence of effective state mechanisms for dispute resolution not only leaves consumers unprotected but also fosters market distortions where the administration of justice is commercialized under the guise of a false ombudsman. In the context of the Dominican Republic, the ineffectiveness and functional vacuum of the National Institute of Protection of Consumer Rights (ProConsumidor) have led to the emergence of a "False Ombudsman" industry, exemplified by entities that instrumentalize consumer complaints in the airline industry with the purpose of generating lucrative mass litigation, replicating predatory patterns similar to those previously observed in the Dominican baseball industry.

The primary objective of this work lies in the analysis of the anatomy of this phenomenon and its impact on the economic and judicial spheres, with the aim of legally characterizing these practices as vexatious litigation and proposing decentralized justice as the imperative structural solution. To this end, a mixed methodology is employed, articulating the dogmatic-comparative analysis of legislation pertaining to frivolous lawsuits and the doctrine of common law, alongside an empirical review of judicial files and financial data derived from litigation against airlines during the 2025 fiscal year, which is subsequently validated through a game-theoretic analysis. The findings confirm that the obsolescence of the Dominican sanctioning regime incentivizes the proliferation of the frivolous lawsuit industry, concluding that the integration of blockchain protocols such as Kleros constitutes not only a technical optimization but the indispensable institutional evolution for the restoration of the Ombudsman figure in the digital age of the Caribbean.

The Absence of Effective Consumer Redress

The Ombudsman's traditional role is that of an appointed governmental officer resolving citizen disputes with government (McClellan, 1968, p. 463). This framework, focused on investigating and solving problems related to government organs, has extended beyond the public sector to include private sector disputes, notably in consumer alternative dispute resolution (Hertogh & Kirkman, 2018, p. 1, 22). These private sector ombudsmen provide independent resolution of consumer disputes with businesses, relying on the hypothesis that fair procedure satisfies users regardless of outcome (Creutzfeldt, 2014, p. 3).

The current state of unregulated private sector Ombudsmen, or rather, Consumer Dispute Resolution (CDR) in the Dominican Republic is challenged by the inefficiency of the primary entity, ProConsumidor, the National Institute of Protection of Consumer Rights. It lacks key ombudsman advantages—such as offering advice, aggregating claims and data, and providing feedback for behavior change (Hertogh & Kirkman, 2018, p. 56). Furthermore, the conciliation process introduces procedural hurdles: mandatory attendance during business hours, case dismissal upon complainant non-appearance, and mere postponement for respondent non-appearance. Should conciliation fail, the complainant is often directed to litigation, while the company must challenge ProConsumidor's sanctions in the Administrative Court due to their contested unconstitutionality. Consequently, the process is protracted, ineffective, and lacks ombudsman attributes.

Effective Consumer Ombudsmen must prioritize efficiency, accessibility, low cost, speed, and user-centricity, offering practical outcomes without the delays of formal litigation (Hertogh & Kirkham, 2018, p. 55). ProConsumidor fails to meet these criteria, leaving consumers with limited recourse. The lack of strong corporate incentive for effective internal dispute resolution has led to the proliferation of for-profit, privately established CDR initiatives, often structured like ombudsmen. These schemes, despite lacking a true ombudsman's impartiality and occasionally escalating minor grievances into large-scale "temerary" litigation, have become a market response for consumer dispute resolution.

The Rise of the "False Ombudsman" and Industrialized Litigation in the Airline Industry

The "False Ombudsman" phenomenon stems not from a typical consumer-company conflict, but from the industrialization of litigation, paralleling the motive behind Law 2-25 on Dominican baseball contracts: profiting from judicial rulings against companies (Alarcón, 2025).

In the MLB context, opposing counsel exploited the ambiguity of Dominican labor laws and baseball players' releases to assert wrongful termination claims (Alarcón, 2025). This created a frivolous litigation industry, succeeding because local courts began favoring players due to the faulty interpretation of one court, which was strategically chosen to emit these rulings, thereby compelling academies to settle confidentially. This subsided only after the Supreme Court established a consistent jurisprudential standard (Asociación Houston Astros de la República Dominicana, Inc. c. Solano Reyes, 2025).

This operational model is now being replicated in the airline industry. Here, the focus shifts to consumer claims against airlines, initiated by legal representatives who functionally mimic a consumer ombudsman but operate as a for-profit entity, lacking the requisite impartiality. While not explicitly using the title, the scheme promotes itself as a body for complaint collection and settlement without consumer action, but systematically deploys legal mechanisms against the airline.

Consequently, this structure, the "False Ombudsman" paradigm, institutionalizes litigation rather than promoting Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), leading to proliferating litigation and leveraging it to necessitate settlements. This is often achieved through "temerary practices," such as large-scale claim generation and pursuing damages exceeding Montreal Convention liability thresholds—a methodology fundamentally incompatible with the ombudsman's non-litigious ethos.

The Legal Characterization of Temerary Litigation in the Dominican Republic: A Comparative Analysis

Accurate categorization of the lawsuits filed against the airlines necessitates the definition of concepts such as "frivolous", “vexatious” and "nuisance" suits, "malicious" suits or intent, and "temerary" litigation. These terminologies will be elucidated through an analysis of international legal doctrine and the limited jurisprudence and legislation available within Dominican Law, thereby facilitating an understanding of whether the lawsuits brought by these False Ombudsmen manifest any of these characteristics and would be considered as ill-intended civil prosecution.

For the purpose of this article, it must be stated that the Dominican legal framework adheres to Romanic-Germanic principles, resulting in a system that combines common law—with binding jurisprudence and customs—and civil law, which is based on legislative statutes that govern the entirety of the country's laws and norms. It is crucial to denote this distinction, as the ensuing concepts will be developed primarily from common law principles and doctrine, necessitating the use of analogous comparisons given their inexact fit within Dominican law or legal culture.

The following two subsections will compare specific legal figures, focusing on their details without evaluating the merits of the lawsuits filed by these False Ombdusmen or determining if their actions constitute vexatious litigation. The primary goal is to highlight the lack of development of the frivolous litigation legal figure in the Dominican Republic and the root cause of the industrialized nature of these lawsuits.

Conceptual Analysis: Frivolous, Vexatious and Nuisance Suits

Hubbard (2014) defines a nuisance suit as a legal action initiated primarily for its positive settlement value, despite the plaintiff and defendant acknowledging that the claim's expected value is lower than the plaintiff's prosecution costs. Elaborating on this definition, Guha (2016) explains that nuisance suits are those where the anticipated damages, given the modest probability of a favorable verdict, are insufficient to justify the expense of litigation. The fundamental motive, as Guha (2016) continuously explains, is to achieve a settlement, driven by the defendant's incentive to offer a settlement to circumvent defense costs. Guha (2016) further characterizes these as suits with low legal merit and a "negative expected value" (NEV). However, Guha (2016, p. 5) cautions that not all NEV suits are nuisance suits; some may be "small-stakes suits" possessing legal merit. In these cases, although the probability of winning is non-negligible, the amount in dispute is so minor that the expected gains from litigation are outweighed by the associated costs.

Hubbard (2014) asserts that frivolous lawsuits, which include but are not limited to nuisance suits, possess shared characteristics. Specifically, these characteristics manifest when the damages sought by the plaintiff are outweighed by the cost of litigation, owing to the exceptionally low merit of the case. Furthermore, these suits exhibit a likelihood of success at summary judgment (or trial) that is so minimal that the expected value of the claim approaches zero. This mechanism suggests that the looming threat of expensive litigation coerces the defendant into agreeing to a settlement, even though the defendant is aware they would likely, or certainly, prevail if the matter were to proceed to trial.

The vexatious nature of these lawsuits is elucidated by Manwell (1966), who explains this terminology as a claim where "the motive of the vexatious litigant may be to harass the other party, to postpone a result he considers unfair, or simply to satisfy some urge to engage in litigation." Manwell (1966) further elaborates that these actions may manifest when, for instance, a litigant "advances or re-advances a claim that has no merit, or brings a multiplicity of actions where one is sufficient." Indeed, an analysis of the observations made by Hubbard (2014), Manwell (1966) and Guha (2016) suggests that the characteristics of nuisance suits and vexatious suits closely parallel the pattern emerging within the airline industry, specifically concerning the lawsuits initiated by False Ombudsmen. As will be thoroughly examined in Point IV, "Economic and Judicial Impact," of this article—where the claimed and awarded amounts, the lawyer's sought liquidation fees, and the judicial trends regarding these liquidations will be detailed—the claims filed by these False Ombudsmen satisfy the criteria for nuisance suits.

This determination is supported by factors such as procedural costs exceeding the returns obtained from the claim (as exemplified in the case Alejandro Biolcati v. Arajet, S.A. (2025)), anticipated damages being insufficient to justify the litigation expenses (e.g., a claim of RD$ 1,200,000.00 resulting in awards between RD$ 200,000.00 (Alejandro Biolcati v. Arajet, S.A., 2025) and RD$ 44,000.00 (Daniela Elisa Raimondi vs. Arajet, S.A., 2025) due to the limitations of the Montreal Convention), and the multitude of annual small-stakes vexatious lawsuits brought against various airlines by these False Ombudsmen, often presented as high-value claims. This pattern demonstrates a Negative Expected Value (NEV) for the plaintiffs and generates a positive settlement value driven by the substantial burden of defense costs, which cumulatively strain the airlines involved in each litigation.

The Role of Malice and Temerity in Litigation within Dominican Legal Framework

Within the Dominican Republic's civil law system, jurisprudence distinguishes between "malice" and "temerity" to define frivolous litigation, a framework comparable to the common law tort of Malicious Civil Litigation under Executive Order No. 368 of 1919. Malice involves utilizing the judicial process in bad faith to obstruct its course or secure an underserved judgment. Temerity, conversely, is the conduct of an individual who proceeds with a claim they know or reasonably ought to know lacks merit, thereby abusing jurisdictional authority (Tirso E. Moquete Mena et al. v. Fiordaliza et al., 2025).

Frivolous litigation is classically defined by malicious intent, which is "the misuse of a right or a privilege for a purpose different from that for which it was established" (Wade, 1986). A key distinction in common law, however, is that malice can manifest as a "vexatious lawsuit with the knowledge that it lacks foundation, but with the purpose of forcing the defendant to accept a settlement" (Wade, 1986, p. 437).

The concept of frivolous litigation is underdeveloped in the Dominican Republic, with the legal principle of Abuse of Law most frequently invoked to address temerary litigation. Abuse of Law is defined as any act or omission that manifestly exceeds the normal limits of a right's exercise, causing harm (De Mata, 1995, p. 179). However, this restrictive application does not recognize all instances of frivolous litigation observed in other jurisdictions.

Due to a scarcity of case law and antiquated legal provisions, defining and applying Dominican legal criteria for temerarious litigation outside its classical meaning is challenging. As clarified in Tirso E. Moquete Mena et al. v. Fiordaliza et al. (2025), the concept is configured as the fraudulent utilization of legal avenues.

In practice, frivolous litigation primarily manifests as the protraction of legal proceedings, a result of the figure's stagnation. The lack of judicial pronouncements assessing continuous and targeted litigation (vexatious and nuisance suits) makes it arduous to determine whether the lawsuits filed by the False Ombudsmen conform to the established criteria, placing airlines in a precarious position due to the relentless multiplicity of these vexatious nuisance suits.

Given the characteristics of the "false ombudsmen" that define the cases and modus operandi of the False Ombudsmen, the concept of abuse of law would not be applicable. This is because the purported victims are unaware of the tactics employed by their legal representatives, much less are they intentionally prosecuting the airlines. This is further evidenced by the service offered by the False Ombudsmen, as they present themselves as a mechanism for responding to claims when airlines fail to do so. Consequently, the more appropriate claim would be that of temerary litigation, which, as will be further explained, proves ineffective.

Sanctions for Temerary Litigation in the Dominican Republic

Sanctions against temerary litigants and their counsel are codified in Dominican law, notably Decree 1290-83 (Code of Ethics of the Dominican Republic Bar Association) and Executive Order No. 378 of 1919. This framework is crucial for understanding initiatives like the False Ombudsmen.

While general civil liability applies, these regulations specifically target bad-faith litigation by legal counsel with financial penalties. Executive Order No. 378 mandates that a reckless litigant must cover all incurred costs, including opposing counsel's fees and expert witness expenses. Furthermore, the law directly sanctions the attorney for unjustified legal action. However, the collection of professional fees under this 1964 law is problematic, often resulting in derisory, non-indexed amounts.

Despite their apparent robustness, these provisions are largely defunct due to economic obsolescence. The 1919 fine, ranging from USD$ 1.56 to USD$ 15.60, has been severely eroded by inflation, offering no deterrent today. For entities filing multimillion-peso lawsuits, a USD$ 15.60 fine is a negligible operating expense.

Moreover, the imposition of sanctions, which requires demonstrating "manifest fault" or "inexcusable ignorance," places a substantial evidentiary burden on the courts. Judges infrequently apply these sanctions sua sponte, preferring to avoid the procedural complexities of disciplining counsel. Consequently, the False Ombudsmen operate with near-absolute impunity, as statutory disincentives are financially absent, compelling airlines to fully absorb the costs stemming from the system's inefficacy.

Economic and Judicial Impact

The 2025 Judicial Branch data reveals over 500 lawsuits against airlines, with lawyers from the False Ombudsman scheme recurrently listed as plaintiffs. Case file analysis indicates that the legal team for Arajet, the airline with the second-highest litigation volume, contends that the claims lodged by the False Ombudsmen constitute a meticulous mechanism for the mass generation of lawsuits. They assert this relies on a standardized narrative engineered to obfuscate the genuine nature of civil liability (Arajet, S.A., 2024).

Unlike the baseball academy context, where new legislation permitted alternative dispute resolution via sports arbitration, the substantial fixed costs and infrastructure dependence of the aviation sector preclude market exit. Lacking legislative support, airlines must rely on court criteria. A significant challenge arises because the monetary value of claims filed by False Ombudsmen has been strategically maintained below the threshold of Law No. 2-23. This maneuver is intended to preclude the appeal for judicial review (cassation) and prevent the highest judicial instance from reviewing the correct application of the law.

Considering a hypothetical single flight with 200 passengers, such as in Alejandro Biolcati v. Arajet, S.A., where damages were claimed—frequently lacking requisite evidence—the potential financial exposure is substantial. With judicial compensations ranging from RD$ 44,000.00 to RD$ 200,000.00 per passenger, the total liability for one incident could reach RD$ 8,800,000.00 or RD$ 40,000,000.00. Given that JetBlue, the carrier with the most 2025 lawsuits, operates numerous flights on high-volume routes, and 28% of cases involve delays, the cumulative financial impact on the industry, for just one route, could amount to an estimated loss of RD$ 528,000,000.00 annually (approximately USD$ 8,516,129.00). These figures underscore the considerable financial vulnerability of the airline industry to unsubstantiated consumer litigation.

Utilizing the Alejandro Biolcati v. Arajet, S.A. example, the attorneys, following a favorable decision (currently under appeal), petitioned for a total award of RD$ 377,150.38. These calculations, prepared by the plaintiffs' counsel, employ cost indexation dating back to 1986. However, courts typically do not award the full liquidation requested. A relevant precedent is the Segunda Sala de la Cámara Civil y Comercial de la Corte de Apelación del Distrito Nacional (2024) approving only RD$ 25,000.00 from a requested RD$ 321,866.02 in cost fees.

Presenting these cost figures illustrates the disincentive for litigation and, more importantly, highlights the increasingly apparent nature of these claims as a tactic to compel airlines into settlement to avoid the litigation process. Given that court-awarded amounts constitute approximately 8% of the sums requested, for every claim, the attorney arguably incurs costs ascending to RD$ 321,866.02, only to receive approximately 8% of that, plus a 30% contingency fee on the decision. In the Biolcati case, with a RD$ 200,000 judgment, the attorney's payout would be RD$ 60,000.00. This suggests that, per case, or at least in the Biolcati case, an attorney sustains a substantial loss amounting to RD$ 114,250.71.

The financial ramifications of this individual loss are considered either a deliberate "customer acquisition cost" or a marketing outlay within the economic framework of vexatious litigation. By pursuing a limited number of cases to their expensive judicial resolution, the legal entity establishes a "credible threat" against the air carrier. The profitability of the "False Ombudsman" model is contingent not upon securing favorable judgments, but rather upon the high volume of settlements achieved. The airline, facing substantial defense expenditures per case, is economically compelled to settle the remaining multitude of claims for their "nuisance value." Consequently, while the attorney may incur a loss of RD$50,000 in court on a single case, they generate significant profit margins from the remaining 499 cases that are settled prematurely due to the airline's aversion to risk.

It is evident how detrimental vexatious litigation is for businesses like airlines. Incidents will inevitably arise, and as travel increases, so too will their frequency, which is why the European Union has established specific legislation addressing this matter.

The Digital Ombudsman: Kleros as a Private Sector Solution

In the absence of a rapid, cost-effective, and user-centric private consumer ombudsman mechanism provided by the Dominican State, the onus is placed upon the private sector to develop a technologically-driven alternative. To this end, alternative dispute resolution solutions such as Kleros and the principles of Decentralized Justice, including their enterprise integration, are proposed.

These systems could operate as internal ombudsmen to adjudicate consumer grievances, thereby facilitating the prompt resolution of meritorious cases. This methodology obviates the necessity of litigating each individual claim in the judicial system, consequently mitigating the financial exigencies placed upon airlines—encompassing expenditures on legal counsel and administrative overhead—while simultaneously curtailing the monetary emoluments accrued by legal practitioners orchestrating these unsubstantiated schemes. Furthermore, this approach could significantly augment the customer support framework and overall customer satisfaction, potentially ensuring impartial and well-substantiated determinations regarding consumer claims, as the decisions would be independent of the airline and subject to review by an, albeit anonymous, panel of adjudicators.

Notwithstanding these benefits, a potential criticism of this integration arises from Article 81 of Dominican Law 358-05, which designates clauses stipulating the "renunciation of the jurisdiction of the courts" as abusive in contracts of adhesion. Nevertheless, a comparative analysis with the Kleros integration in Mendoza can be undertaken to derive conclusions regarding the feasibility of its implementation in the Dominican Republic. By rendering the Kleros ruling "consultative" rather than ab initio binding, the airline avoids compelling the consumer to waive jurisdiction, thereby satisfying the requirements of Article 81. Instead, the airline voluntarily extends a settlement offer predicated upon the oracle's output. Should the consumer accept, the dispute is resolved; otherwise, they retain their fundamental right to pursue formal litigation. This same logical rationale underpins the Agreement executed between Kleros and the Supreme Court of Justice of Mendoza.

As mentioned, the Framework Collaboration Agreement signed in September 2024 between the Supreme Court of Justice of Mendoza (SCJM) directly integrates decentralized justice into the Juzgado de Paz and Contraventional Court of Lavalle through a pilot test (Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Provincia de Mendoza & Coopérative Kleros, 2024). Under this scheme, the court remits anonymized files to the Kleros platform, where decentralized jurors issue a ruling. Although the agreement explicitly establishes that these determinations are consultative in nature and lack binding character for the local judge (Suprema Corte de Justicia de la Provincia de Mendoza & Coopérative Kleros, 2024).

As previously stated, the structure of False Ombudsmen entirely circumvents established airline customer support channels. This is notable as the general ineffectiveness of these channels in upholding customer satisfaction is precisely the factor that motivates consumers to utilize claims services and thereby sustain the False Ombudsman business model. Despite this, as explained previously in this article, the hypothesis planted by Creutzfeldt (2014) still remains relevant, equitable participation within a complaint procedure can lead to the satisfaction of ombudsman users, even when the resolution of their complaint is unfavorable. This element of procedural fairness, consequently, establishes legitimacy and encourages user adherence to the Consumer Dispute Resolution (CDR) scheme. This constitutes a primary rationale for why protocols such as Kleros possess the potential to resolve the fundamental problem confronting the airlines: the issue is not one of temerary litigation, but rather of dissatisfied clientele.

Currently, Kleros is collaborating with the judicial branch of Argentina (Poder Judicial de Mendoza, 2025) and the FinTech service provider LemonCash (Ast et al., 2024) to operate as a "decentralized consumer ombusdman." In this function, consumers present disputes regarding products or services, and a panel of jurors carries out an impartial and transparent evaluation of the claims. This procedure is designed to be carried out "without costly litigation for the Company" (Kleros, n.d.). As will be detailed in Section B, "Kleros Enterprise Integrations in Real Life: Consumer vs. GOL Linhas Aéreas S.A. and Despegar.com.ar S.A.," one of Kleros' practical cases will be presented, particularly relevant to the airline industry, where a passenger claim case against an airline was successfully resolved. This is favorable for Creutzfeldt's hypothesis (2014), given that it confers transparency to the process, provides a foundation for it, and, above all, constitutes a much more expedited procedure than a lawsuit or judicial claim would have been.

Decentralized Justice: Kleros Enterprise and Justice-as-a-Service (JaaS)

Kleros constitutes a decentralized Justice-as-a-Service (JaaS) platform, developed for the arbitration of simple controversies within the blockchain ecosystem (Schmitz, 2025). By serving as a web app decentralized online dispute resolution (ODR) protocol (Féliz Guerrero & Féliz Guerrero, 2025), its fundamental objective lies in the administration of justice in fully digital environments of Web3, thereby resolving disputes emanating from smart contracts (Bergolla et al., 2022). More specifically, to operate, Kleros utilizes the collective intelligence of its juror body through the crowdsourced online dispute resolution (CODR) model (Allen et al., 2019; Zhuk, 2023). This signifies that “any individual within the community is eligible to participate as a juror, and that determinations are issued not by a singular authority, but rather by the collective intellect of its users” (Féliz Guerrero & Féliz Guerrero, 2025), thereby facilitating the transparent, equitable, and incorruptible resolution of disputes.The most salient legal consequence is that its awards possess erga omnes binding effects, even overriding traditional jurisdictions (Dincer, 2024).

The Kleros crypto-arbitration model operates through a potential dual mechanism for online dispute resolution, manifesting in two modalities with distinct operational logics: the off-chain approach and the on-chain approach. The off-chain approach subjects disputes to conventional commercial litigation procedures—referred to as "tradlaw"—under instruments such as the New York Convention, utilizing a crypto-asset-powered ODR decision making mechanism. In contrast, the on-chain approach operates endogenously within the blockchain ecosystem via Blockchain Dispute Resolution (BDR) protocols (Sievi & Donzelli, 2025; Senapati & Anand, 2024). This modality resolves only those cases whose arbitral award can be automatically executed within the blockchain, pertaining to what is termed web3 law. Nonetheless, Kleros’ main objective is to deliver decisions in a swift, cost-effective, reliable, and decentralized manner—without recourse to state courts or traditional arbitration services (Féliz Guerrero & Féliz Guerrero, 2025, p. 6).

Initially, the application of this technology was predominantly confined to integration within dispute-generating environments centered on blockchain, cryptoassets, or the broader web3 domain (Kleros, n.d.). This included the resolution of disputes stemming from smart contracts through on-chain arbitral awards, as well as the resolution of off-chain disputes that nonetheless concerned the crypto-community or, more specifically, individuals proficient in the utilization and manipulation of the underlying technology powering Kleros. This limitation was not due to the technology's inherent unsuitability for broader applications—despite its initial focus on crypto solutions—but rather was a consequence of the unimplemented abstraction, which the Kleros Enterprise branch of the project is now specifically designed to address (Kleros, n.d.).

The Challenges of Widespread Adoption and the Kleros Solution for Facilitating the Implementation of Justice as a Service (JaaS).

Despite its potential, the widespread adoption of blockchain technology is primarily impeded by poor usability, a factor that, as noted by Jang et al. (2020, p. 4), "impedes the use of emerging technologies" such as blockchain, notwithstanding the innovation's long-standing promise. In the year 2020, it was evidenced that "among approximately 86,000 promoted blockchain projects, only 8% have survived" (Jang et al., 2020, p. 3). Stoica (2023) contends that Web3 spaces must prioritize "the need to improve the user experience by simplifying their interaction with the technical side of the blockchain." This lack of adoption is not solely attributable to the technology being perceived as a superficial, all-encompassing solution driven by hype and marketing. Rather, its practical application necessitates technical knowledge that is generally unfamiliar to the common populace (Jang et al., 2020; Chehore, 2022; Stoica, 2023).

Consequently, the cryptocurrency community has shifted its focus towards a user-centric methodology (Jang et al., 2020), which Chehore (2022, p. 10) terms Human Centered Design (HCD), defining it as the "process of designing that centers around the end-users." This concept recognizes that while blockchain technology offers substantial utility, the prerequisite for users to fully comprehend its inherent complexities represents a significant impediment to widespread adoption (Jang et al., 2020; Stoica, 2023). One of the obstacles concerning blockchain implementation, as identified by Jang et al. (2020) and Stoica (2023), is "account abstraction," defined as “a proposal that aims to enhance the interaction between the end user and decentralized applications” (Stoica, 2023, p. 1). Account abstraction is engineered to preserve the underlying technology as a foundational element while simultaneously facilitating the utilization of the technology itself without mandating mastery of all the technical specifications, thereby promoting “improved security, a better user experience, and the ability to pay gas fees in any token” (Stoica, 2023, p. 5) without the necessity of managing the intricacies of owning and operating a crypto wallet.

Essentially, the adaptation of blockchain technology relies on being leveraged as an underlying framework for a primary utility, rather than being actively marketed as the main application. Even so, “experts have emphasized the urgent need to improve the user perception and experience related to blockchain technology“ (Jang et al., 2020, p. 3). This paradigm, which pertains to "users that are not interested in cryptocurrency or blockchain technology but are interested in using DApps" (Jang et al., 2020, p. 3), implies that users' interaction is confined exclusively to the application where the blockchain framework has been implemented, rather than necessitating navigation through tools such as web3 wallets, private and public keys, gas fees, and various chains.

The successful adoption of blockchain technology necessitates the integration of concepts such as account abstraction, as discussed by Stoica (2023), and the implementation of enhanced user experience (UX) and user-centric designs or HCD, as elucidated by Jang et al. (2020) and Chehore (2022). Consequently, the future viability of decentralized applications (DApps) hinges upon the ease with which the average user can implement these technologies without requiring an in-depth understanding of the associated technical jargon.

In the domain of Justice-as-a-Service (JaaS), Kleros Enterprise has achieved significant progress in streamlining the implementation of its technology. Further refinement remains necessary, particularly regarding the technical implementation of account abstraction to facilitate easier account creation and the reception of juror compensation. Although this has consistently been envisioned by the Kleros team, as articulated in their whitepaper (Leseage & Ast, 2019), the enterprise's roadmap nonetheless indicates progress in facilitating the integration of the JaaS service by governments and corporations (Kleros, n.d.), as previously detailed.

Kleros Enterprise Real-Life Integrations: Consumer v. GOL Linhas Aéreas S.A. & Despegar.com.ar S.A.

The proliferation of Justice as a Service has been notable throughout the decade, particularly evidenced by its application in consumer affairs and, more pertinently to this article, in disputes between airlines and passengers. The Kleros team has successfully deployed its services within this sector, exemplified by its collaboration with the Municipality of Junín in Buenos Aires, Argentina. A significant illustration is the case of Consumer v. GOL Linhas Aereas, where Kleros effectively resolved controversies involving airline passengers.

Regarding the Junín Consumer case, the matter involved a complaint submitted by a passenger with a verified disability to the local Consumer Information Office (OMIC) of Junín. The claim was filed against GOL Linhas Aéreas and Despegar, stemming from a flight cancellation and a subsequent failure to provide necessary assistance, which compelled the passenger to incur expenses for VIP lounge access (Consumer v. GOL Linhas Aéreas S.A. & Despegar.com.ar S.A., 2025).

Although the airline attempted to impede the administrative proceedings by asserting that the local municipal office lacked jurisdiction over federal aeronautical matters and the Montreal Convention, the dispute was successfully resolved through the Kleros Consumer and Neighborhood Disputes Court (Consumer v. GOL Linhas Aéreas S.A. & Despegar.com.ar S.A., 2025). In November 2025, decentralized jurors meticulously reviewed the evidence—including the absence of prior notification and the passenger's vulnerability—and voted to "Accept the Claim." The jurors explicitly dismissed the airline's plea of incompetence by applying the pro-consumer principles enshrined in Argentinian Law 24.240 and the Kleros "General Policy on Consumer Disputes," thereby establishing a clear operational framework wherein decentralized justice functions as an efficient extension of state-level consumer defense mechanisms (Consumer v. GOL Linhas Aéreas S.A. & Despegar.com.ar S.A., 2025).

The total expenditure for this dispute amounted to 0.0378 ETH (approximately $127.44 USD), encompassing a negligible $0.04 in gas fees (Arbiscan, 2025). This result suggests a potential financial incentive for airline operators, as cases analogous to Biolcati's could have been adjudicated at a significantly reduced cost. A comparison of the legacy defense expenditure of RD$ 321,866 (approximately $5,200 USD) per claim with the $127.44 USD execution cost of the Kleros protocol demonstrates an efficiency improvement exceeding 40-fold.

Conclusion

The institutional inadequacy of ProConsumidor in providing an efficient dispute resolution mechanism has created a substantial gap within Dominican consumer protection. This functional deficit has inadvertently driven market self-regulation, resulting in the emergence of the "False Ombudsman" industry, typified by profit-driven. Rather than engaging in impartial mediation, these private actors have exploited consumer grievances through industrialized litigation, prioritizing contingency fees and the pursuit of nuisance suits over genuine alternative dispute resolution. By leveraging the economic asymmetry between defense costs and potential settlement values, this phenomenon imposes undue financial burden on the airline industry through unwarranted claims while affording consumers minimal benefit beyond a mere tool for leverage. Ultimately, the proliferation of these temerary practices constitutes a direct indictment of the current system's inability to adapt, thereby necessitating a transition toward more robust, non-litigious solutions.

Addressing this systemic deficiency necessitates a transition beyond conventional institutional implementation, advocating for the adoption of Kleros as the technological evolution of the Ombudsman function within the Caribbean's economy. By integrating decentralized justice, this paradigm shifts from adversarial litigation to a transparent "Justice-as-a-Service" framework This evolution reinstates the Ombudsman's core mission—impartial, expeditious, and accessible redress—while leveraging blockchain's immutability to establish trust independent of governmental oversight. Through user-centric innovations, such as enterprise integration, this decentralized methodology circumvents the bureaucratic impediments inherent in the current system, thereby eliminating the financial incentives that perpetuate the "False Ombudsman" phenomenon. Consequently, the adoption of this digital standard constitutes not merely a technological enhancement, but a requisite maturation of the Caribbean legal infrastructure toward a more equitable and efficient consumer protection ecosystem.

References